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Preface 
Evidence from research and experience shows that cooperatives – and similar forms of producer 
organizations – can help small and family farmers capture a higher share of the value added in the 
food chain. These organizations create bargaining power and economies of scale for their members. 
They also reduce market risks and transaction costs, provide access to productive resources, and 
enable their members to influence policy-making processes. For downstream private enterprises in the 
food chain, cooperatives play an essential role as aggregators, in securing quality and timely supply of 
agricultural products. In addition, cooperatives provide inputs and technical advice to member 
smallholders. Thus, agricultural cooperatives offer a wide range of services to their members and 
other actors in the food chain and at the same time play a key role in achieving food security and 
contributing to rural development. 
Agricultural cooperatives operate in a rapidly changing environment, characterized by globalized 
agricultural markets and liberalization, climate change and food insecurity, and changing consumer 
demands. Therefore, agricultural cooperatives have to continuously adapt to the changing economic 
and institutional environment, competing and interacting with other types of enterprises, while trying 
to maintain their specific identity as social and economic organizations. 
The changing environment also creates new challenges for policymakers. The agricultural cooperative 
of the future has other demands as to the institutional environment, if it wants to remain competitive 
and sustainable. It is therefore essential to fully understand the factors related to the institutional 
environment that influence the performance and sustainability of cooperatives. Increased 
understanding of the realities and challenges will provide insights for a supportive institutional 
environment that may lead to conducive public policy and well-targeted development support. 
The present study focuses on dairy cooperatives in Kenya and Morocco, to explore how and to what 
extent the institutional environment has been enabling the development and performance of the 
cooperatives. The focus on dairy generates insights that are relevant for many countries, because it is 
a sector in which cooperatives have a relatively high market share. Kenya and Morocco are especially 
interesting cases because they are both large milk producers, among the top-10 in Africa. The study 
zooms in on two key challenges for the cooperatives and their options for finding appropriate 
solutions: systems to assure the quality of the milk, and methods to offer attractive payments to the 
farmers. 
The study was carried led by Wageningen Economic Research, by assignment of – and in close 
collaboration with - the team Producer Organizations and Cooperatives of FAO. The authors express 
their gratitude and acknowledgement to the representatives of the cooperatives and professional 
associations in Kenya and Morocco, who were so kind as to share their time, views and experience 
with the research team. 
Prof.dr.ir. J.G.A.J. van der Vorst 
General Director Social Sciences Group 
Wageningen University & Research 
Dr. Marcela Villarreal 
Director of Partnerships, Advocacy and Capacity 
Development Division 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
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Executive summary 
This study analyses the relationship between selected dairy cooperatives in Kenya and Morocco and 
the institutional environment. It compares ten Moroccan and Kenyan dairy marketing cooperatives and 
suggests possible development strategies, support programmes and enabling policies in order to 
address two main organizational challenges, namely quality assurance systems to deliver quality milk 
to the processing industry, and attractive and cost-efficient payment modalities for members. We 
discuss ways in which the institutional environment can be strengthened to support dairy cooperatives 
in overcoming these challenges, by looking into three areas: internal organizational strengthening of 
the cooperative sector, public support including conducive policies and regulations, and the facilitation 
of multi-stakeholder platforms to discuss, propose and implement enabling policies. 
Dairy cooperatives need a more enabling institutional environment 
The study shows a remarkably different picture of dairy cooperatives in Kenya and Morocco. In Kenya, 
the first-tier, primary collection cooperatives resemble the archetypical multi-purpose cooperative, with 
multiple services to members that create commitment and supply loyalty. In Kenya, the cooperative 
sector collects only milk from members. In Morocco, the primary cooperatives are different from the 
archetypical cooperative, because they may include members that function as ‘peddlers’ to collect milk 
from other non-member farmers in addition to their own supply. Primary cooperatives buy a substantial 
part of the milk from informal peddlers. This practice limits traceability and quality control, and weakens 
the loyalty of farmers to their cooperative and their willingness to invest in collective action. 
 
Both countries show similarities in the development of their institutional context, with high state 
involvement in the 1960-70s, which was gradually replaced by an increased role for private investments 
in processing in the 1980s, followed by a phase of liberalization with unregulated dairy prices from the 
1990 onwards. The study shows that both in Kenya and in Morocco, the institutional environment can be 
improved in order to facilitate the development of cooperatives and to increase their possibilities to find 
efficient solutions for the organizational challenges related to quality improvement and member 
payment. From our exploration it became clear that developing and implementing quality testing 
systems are typically the tasks of public-private partnerships, as state regulation and financial support 
must go hand-in-hand with strict agreements both among cooperatives and between cooperatives and 
private milk processors. 
 
In Kenya, the cooperative sector is based on a strong network of first- and second-tier cooperatives, 
which have developed links with the private sector and policy making processes, including an active 
coordinating role for the Kenyan Dairy Board. In Morocco, the links between dairy cooperatives, dairy 
processing companies and the government have only recently started to materialize. A promising 
development is the recent establishment of the interprofessional platform, FIMALAIT, to design 
appropriate dairy policies, and act as a mobiliser of investment support to address the milk quality 
challenges. In the end, good collaboration among the state, farmer organizations, private companies and 
NGOs, could lead to a more “pro-active role in overcoming market constraints to achieve pro-poor 
agricultural growth” (Ortmann and King, 2007). 
Organizational challenges are inherent to collective marketing  
In their ambition to be effective marketing organizations for their members, cooperatives face several 
organizational challenges. The main challenge for a cooperative is to effectively manage the tensions 
between individual members and the cooperative. The individual member has an interest in reducing 
effort (and thus costs) in reaching a certain product quality level, while the cooperative has an interest in 
receiving products that have the agreed quality level, as that directly relates to efficiency in processing 
and marketing. Internal regulations on quality can help to solve this problem. However, internal 
regulations do not work effectively in situations where quality cannot easily (i.e. against low cost) be 
measured and in situations where farmers have alternative sales options that do not require good quality 
milk. In both Kenya and Morocco, the dairy cooperatives found various ways to resolve these agency 
dilemmas. 
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Policy recommendations 
In both countries, the changes in the dairy landscape following the liberalization of the dairy markets 
in the 1980 and 1990s represent a need and opportunity to redefine not only the roles of the various 
private actors but also that of the state, towards an increase in quantity and quality of milk production 
and a more equitable distribution of benefits along the dairy chain. The state can perform an 
important facilitating role by presenting a strategic vision of dairy development, stimulating the 
coordination among public and private actors in the dairy industry, and presenting clear regulations on 
milk quality and fair payment schemes. 
 
Both quality improvement and the introduction of fair and efficient payment schemes may need closer 
collaboration between public and private partners in the dairy industry – not only to improve 
information exchange for learning purposes, but also because some regulation may be needed to help 
the sector solve collective action problems. These regulations may be issued by the state or by a 
public-private organization with sufficient authority in the industry. By facilitating the creation of a 
platform for professional organizations and agricultural cooperatives to discuss policies, the 
government can support the development of much-needed networking and collaboration. 
 
The state can induce dairy processors to pay dairy cooperatives immediately upon delivery of the milk, 
so that the latter can promptly pay their members. The state can also facilitate the credit provisioning 
by banks to shorten the payment period for milk supplied to the cooperatives. The state could reduce 
the risk that private sector banks face when dealing with dairy farmers and cooperatives by offering 
low-interest funds for financial products targeted to dairy development, or guarantee funds for 
working-capital loans to cooperatives. 
Case study method 
In each of the two countries, various dairy cooperatives were selected to cover a diversity of 
organizational forms. Information about these cooperatives was collected through in-depth interviews 
with each of the three different stakeholder groups: professional staff (e.g. manager and quality 
manager), board members (e.g. president and vice-president), and members (e.g. a small and a large 
dairy farmer). The interview reports were coded using qualitative coding software Atlas.ti™, to 
facilitate the comparative analysis and synthesis of findings from the cooperatives within each country 
as well as between the two countries. The sample of cooperatives in each country did not pretend to 
be representative of the sector as a whole, but to be diverse enough in size, location and functions to 
obtain an insight into the main organizational challenges related to quality assurance, payment system 
and training of staff. 
 
The Kenya case study covered six dairy cooperatives, all sourcing milk from smallholder producers, 
but differing in size and activities. Four of the cooperatives only functioned as bulking nodes for raw 
milk delivered to private processors, whereas other cooperatives had their own processing units. In 
Morocco, four case studies were carried out. The sample included three milk collection cooperatives 
and one processing cooperative. In addition, staff of two professional organizations related to the dairy 
chain in Morocco were interviewed.  
 
 
  Cooperative Date of 
creation 
Initial number of 
members 
Current number 
of members 
Daily milk volumes 
collected (metric tons) 
KENYA Githunguri Dairy 
Farmers  
1961 31 23 000 200.0 
Muki Dairy Farmers  1989 9 15 000 70.0 
Mumberes Farmers  1960 74 3 300 14.0 
Sabatia Farmers  1963 611 3 400 9.0 
Cheptiret Dairy Farmers  2010 20 80 3.0 
Ukuu Farmers  2000 150 700 1.2 
Morocco Colait/Extralait 1953 21 88 165.0 
Al Mouna 2000 12 9 3.7 
Al Badre 2003 71 81 2.5 
Al Fouarate 1978 27 56 1.6 
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1 Introduction 
Producer organizations and agricultural cooperatives are key contributors to achieving food security 
and reducing hunger in the world. They provide a wide range of services to their member producers – 
including access to output and input markets, financial services, access to and management of natural 
resources, as well as influence in policy-making processes. Inclusive and efficient producer 
organizations and agricultural cooperatives are essential for a thriving agricultural sector and for 
boosting rural economies, as they create jobs and help improve their members’ incomes and 
livelihoods. In order for these organizations to perform their role as service providers and employment 
generators, they need an institutional environment that facilitates their establishment and 
development under viable conditions. The institutional environment within which producer 
organizations and agricultural cooperatives operate is crucial, as it has an effect on the sustainability 
of these organizations. Enabling institutions are, for example, transparent and sound regulatory and 
legal frameworks, a climate conducive to investment, as well as space for policy dialogue with the 
government. 
 
Milk production is an important economic activity of millions of small farmers and landless labourers. 
As a highly perishable product, milk requires special and timely care. Collective action, in the form of 
agricultural cooperatives and other types of producer organizations (PO) is used to link smallholder 
farmers to processing plants (Bijman et al., 2016; Dorward et al., 2003). Agricultural cooperatives and 
producer organizations in the dairy sector operate within a broader economic and institutional 
environment. To perform well, they require an external environment that supports their organization, 
operations and strategies. In other words, they require an “enabling environment” that helps them to 
prosper.  
 
This field study is linked to wider research on the interaction between organizational challenges in 
collective marketing and the institutional environment in which these cooperatives operate (Bijman 
et al., 2012; Bijman et al., 2016). The research is focussed on the dairy sector. Two typical 
organizational challenges have been selected: developing and applying an effective and efficient 
quality assurance system; and developing and applying a payment system that reduces financial costs 
and risks to the organization. The field research intends to ‘ground’ the analysis of policies that affect 
the institutional environment in the real-world practices of dairy cooperatives in two countries: 
Morocco and Kenya. Therefore, in each country, the institutional environment was described and 
several in-depth case studies of dairy cooperatives were conducted. 
1.1 Conceptual framework 
The research is centred on the capacity of dairy cooperatives to organize collective marketing to the 
satisfaction of both the members and the organization (Ton, 2010). This capacity is enabled or 
constrained by an external environment. A dairy cooperative operates within a particular context and 
results in certain outcomes (costs and benefits) (Figure 1). To perform well, the cooperative needs to 
develop and apply effective systems for quality assurance, payment and Human Resource 
Management (HRM). Organizational capacities result from social capital that is created when 
individuals “spend time and energy working with other individuals to find better ways of making 
possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” (Ostrom, 1996). 
Producer organizations and agricultural cooperatives are organizational expressions of this social 
capital (Herbel and Ourabah Haddad, 2012). 
 
We focussed the study especially on the influence that institutions have on the marketing capacity of 
agricultural cooperatives and producer organizations. These organizations try to adapt to the 
institutional environment to better suit their needs (Herbel and Ourabah Haddad, 2012), and/or 
strategically use policies or regulations in a way that create most benefit for the cooperative (Mendoza 
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and Ton, 2003). The institutional environment becomes enabling when there are transparent and 
sound regulatory and legal frameworks (World Bank, 2012), enabling policies (Agarwal, 2001; 
Penrose-Buckley, 2007; Markelova and Mwangi, 2010), a climate conducive to investment through 
incentives and other support services (Gijselinckx and Bussels, 2014), and spaces for policy dialogue, 
allowing social capital development (Coleman, 1988). Well-designed institutions are key requirements 
to make markets function for the poor, (Dorward et al., 2003; Biénabe and Sautier, 2005). 
Institutions are seen as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990) that define the room for cooperative 
problem-solving and development. Dairy cooperatives benefit from institutions that support 
collaboration, induce trust and long-term commitment and foster transparency. In addition, formal 
institutions such as regulations can help to clarify the rights and obligations of the various 
stakeholders, and can provide legitimacy to the collective actions of the organizations (Agarwal, 2001; 
Thorp et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual framework for the analysis of organizational challenges in collective 
marketing, based on Ton (2015) 
 
 
A dairy cooperative operates in an institutional context that affects certain outcomes related to 
technical and organizational efficiency (see Figure 1). The institutional context consists of markets, 
infrastructures, institutions per se, networks and trust (Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Ostrom and Ahn, 
2009). We focus on two outcome areas: milk quality and organizational efficiency. In order to 
safeguard and improve milk quality in expanding markets, efficiency in processing as well as quality 
assurance systems are needed. Organizational efficiency is also a key factor affecting the sustainability 
of organizations that operate in a competitive market environment. Organizational efficiency requires 
a good balance between ensuring rewarding milk prices for members and retaining a part of earnings 
in the cooperative for use as working capital and for making future investments. The contextual 
factors on which we focus are e.g. institutions such as regulatory frameworks, economic incentives 
and policy dialogue facilitation, as we expect these institutions to affect the ability of cooperatives to 
enhance milk quality and maintain organizational efficiency. 
 
The main research question addressed in this paper is “What is the influence of the external 
environment on how dairy cooperatives deal with two organizational challenges?” More specifically, 
how do these cooperatives develop and apply (1) an effective and efficient milk quality assurance 
system and (2) payment systems that can accommodate the financial needs of both smallholder 
members and the cooperative organization? 
CONTEXT
Markets
Infrastructure
Institutions
• Policies and regulation
• Support programmes
• Policy dialogue platforms
Networks
Trust
ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHALLENGES
Quality assurance
Payment modalities
OUTCOMES
Technical efficiency: 
Milk quality
Organizational efficiency: 
Member loyalty 
FEEDBACK
Experiential learning
COLLECTIVE 
MARKETING 
CAPACITIES
FEEDBACK
Advocacy activities
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Challenge 1 - Developing and applying effective and efficient quality assurance systems 
The first organizational challenge relates to the development and application of a quality assurance 
system (Kirezieva et al., 2016). Good-quality milk is important for processors as it enhances the 
efficiency of processing, but it is also important for consumers as it affects food safety and nutrition 
security (Luning et al., 2015). In this context, a cooperative faces agency problems between an 
individual member and the cooperative. The individual member has an interest in reducing effort (and 
thus costs) in reaching a certain product quality level, while the cooperative has an interest in 
receiving products of agreed quality level as that directly relates to efficiency in processing and 
marketing (Ton, 2015). Low-quality milk cannot be used for pasteurized milk. For cheese or yoghurt 
making, the milk needs to be free of antibiotics. Low and variable milk quality poses a risk for the 
cooperative in its marketing activities. Improperly processed milk may result in a food safety risk for 
consumers, as bacteria from cows may be transmitted to consumers. Also, foreign substances added 
to the milk may pose a risk to consumers, as was shown by the 2008 melamine scandal (Pei et al., 
2011). 
 
Control of milk quality is one of the main issues for which individual dairy farmers may have a 
different interest than the group – the farmer wants to deliver all milk produced, irrespective of its 
quality, whereas the cooperative only wants to receive milk that complies with minimum quality 
standards. This inherent tension between the group (as an organization) and individual members is 
known as the agency problem. Agency theory addresses information asymmetry and incompatibility of 
incentives between trading parties. It applies in situations in which one party has an informational 
advantage over another that can be exploited to the benefit of the advantaged party at the expense of 
the trading partner, whenever this information asymmetry is costly to correct (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
 
To solve the agency problem and prevent opportunistic behaviour on the part of members, a 
cooperative may implement internal rules and regulations to disclose the information of members 
about the quality of his or her milk through quality testing, and reject the milk or apply discounts in 
case of sub-standard quality deliveries. However, quality control does not work effectively in situations 
where quality cannot easily (i.e. against low cost) be measured and in situations where farmers have 
alternative sales options that do not require good quality milk (Mujawamariya et al., 2013). 
Challenge 2 - Offering attractive and cost-efficient payment modalities 
An agricultural cooperative needs to pay for the milk purchased from its suppliers and inputs or 
services advanced to its members. Many smallholder farmers tend to face cash constraints and need 
quick payment, whereas the cooperative needs time to complete transactions with the processing 
client. The cooperative requires working capital in order to resolve this tension – working capital has a 
price, however. Delayed payment systems are needed when the group cannot access bank loans. 
However, the cooperative faces competition from other buyers, who may pay farmers directly for the 
milk produced. Moreover, dairy cooperatives often facilitate inputs (feed), services (veterinary) or 
loans to members, to be discounted from milk payments. This repayment scheme can become an 
incentive for farmers to side-sell and thereby obtain a higher price from external buyers. Precise 
internal rules and regulations concerning milk payment and input provisioning to members will vary 
according to the needs of the producers, the trust between the cooperative and its members as well as 
the presence of competing buyers. Payment modalities applied in dairy cooperatives vary according to 
inter-organizational trust, market dynamics, banking technology, legal provisions and regulations and 
other types of institutional features. 
1.2 Research methodology 
In each of the two countries, five dairy cooperatives were selected to cover a diversity of 
organizational forms, which were differently affected by the institutional environment. Each case-study 
was based on in-depth interviews with each of the three different stakeholder groups: professional 
staff (e.g. manager and quality manager), board members (e.g. president and vice-president), and 
members (e.g. a small and a large dairy farmer). The interview reports were coded using Atlas.ti™ 
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software, to facilitate the analysis and synthesis of findings from the cooperatives in each country as 
well as the comparative analysis between the two countries. 
 
The sample of cooperatives in each country did not pretend to be representative of the sector as a 
whole, but to be diverse enough in size, location and functions to obtain an insight from different 
perspectives on the main organizational challenges related to quality assurance, payment system and 
training of staff. We explicitly aimed at conducting an exploratory study to identify entry points for 
policies and institutions that may help cooperatives to find effective and efficient solutions for inherent 
tensions in collective marketing (Ton, 2015). We intended the study to have a wider relevance than 
only for the two countries included in the study. 
Sample of cooperatives in Kenya. 
The Kenya case study covered a total of six dairy cooperatives, all sourcing milk from smallholder 
producers, but differing in size and activities. Some cooperatives only functioned as bulking nodes for 
raw milk collected by private processors, whereas other cooperatives had their own processing units. 
The cooperatives all started with a small number of founding members. As Table 1 shows, some are 
still small, e.g. the Cheptiret cooperative, whereas others developed into large organizations, such as 
the Githunguri and Muki cooperatives. Muki Dairy Farmers Cooperative Society collects milk in three 
catchment districts of Kipipiri, Kinangop and South Kinangop. It owns a modern processing plant, 
Kinangop Dairy Ltd, which has a processing capacity of 40 000 litres daily. Githunguri Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative Society trades processed milk products under the name ‘FRESHA’. Its average daily milk 
intake stands at 200 000 litres. It has a workforce of 8 000, and turnover was about 6 billion Kenya 
shillings in 2013. 
 
Average milk production is low, in a range of 2 to 10 litres per day per lactating cow. The Ukuu 
cooperative has the lowest daily milk volume; it functions as a bulking node, and has no processing 
activities. Muki and Githunguri, in contrast, are multi-purpose cooperatives with a milk processing 
unit. All cooperatives source exclusively from their registered members. The main characteristics of 
these six dairy cooperatives are reported in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 Kenyan dairy cooperatives included in the study 
 Cooperative Githunguri 
Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative 
Society 
Muki Dairy 
Farmers 
Cooperative 
Society 
Mumberes 
Farmers 
Cooperative 
Society 
Sabatia 
Farmers 
Cooperative 
Society 
Cheptiret 
Dairy 
Farmers 
Cooperative 
Ukuu Farmers 
Dairy 
Cooperative 
Society 
Location Githunguri Dunyu Njeru-
Kinangop 
Mumberes- 
Eldama Ravine 
Eldama Ravine Cheptiret-
Eldoret 
Kiriane-Meru 
Date of creation 1961 1989 1960 1963 2010 2000 
Initial number of 
members 
31 9 74 611 20 150 
Current number of 
members 
23 000 15 000 3 300 3 400 80 700 
Daily milk volumes 
collected (metric 
tons) 
200 70 14 9 3 1.25 
Source: Interviews done by the authors 
 
Sample of cooperatives in Morocco 
Four case studies of dairy cooperatives in Morocco were carried out in 2015/2016, through in-depth 
semi-structured interviews. The sample included three milk collection cooperatives and one processing 
cooperative. In addition, two professional organizations related to the dairy chain in Morocco were 
interviewed. Two of the collection cooperatives are located in large-scale irrigation schemes, the Al 
Badre cooperative in the Tadla area (eastern-central part of Morocco) and the Al Fouarate cooperative 
in the vicinity of Kenitra city, in the Gharb large-scale irrigation area (northwestern part of Morocco). 
The third milk collection co-operative, Al Mouna, is located in the rainfed agricultural area of 
Khémisset, in the Central-Western part of the country. The fourth cooperative, Colait/Extralait, is a 
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dairy processor. It is located in the Gharb irrigation area, and it was established in 1953 during the 
French colonial era, in order to add value to the milk output of the region and to supply dairy products 
to growing neighbouring cities. The main characteristics of these four dairy cooperatives are reported 
in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2 Moroccan dairy cooperatives included in the study 
Cooperative Colait/Extralait Al Mouna Al Badre Al Fouarate 
Location Gharb irrigation 
scheme 
Khémisset rainfed 
area 
Tadla irrigation 
scheme 
Gharb irrigation 
scheme 
Date of creation 1953 2000 2003 1978 
Initial number of members 21 12 71 27 
Current number of members 88 9 81 56 
Daily milk volumes collected (metric 
tons) 
165 3.7 2.5 1.6 
Non-member supply (%) 10 20 0 35 
Source: Interviews done by the authors 
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2 Organizational and institutional 
challenges for Kenyan dairy 
cooperatives 
2.1 Institutional context 
Structure of the dairy value chain 
Kenya has the largest dairy herd in Africa, with smallholders accounting for 70-80 percent of the total 
production (Wambugu et al., 2011). The sector has an estimated yearly production of 5 billion litres of 
milk, with most of the production being located in the Rift Valley and Central regions. However, other 
regions, including Eastern, Nyanza and Western regions, also produce significant quantities of milk. 
The sector is important for its role in poverty alleviation in both the rural and urban areas. This is 
reflected in its contribution to food and nutritional security and increased household incomes. The 
dairy sector accounts for 14 percent of agricultural GDP and 6-8 percent of the country’s GDP. 
Moreover, the sector generates an estimated 1 million jobs at farm level and an additional 500 000 in 
direct waged employment. 
 
Because of fragmentation and production of small quantities, small-scale dairy farmers have realised 
the need to organize themselves so that they can bulk and sell their milk collectively. Therefore, the 
marketing of milk in Kenya is dominated by dairy cooperatives. Currently, there are more than 
13 000 cooperatives, facilitating market access for more than 1.5 million dairy farmers. Cooperative 
societies and cooperative unions provide milk collection, cooling and bulking services. Processors 
collect the milk from the bulking units of these cooperatives. 
 
Milk chilling hubs have been promoted in partnerships between cooperative societies and development 
organizations. These chilling hubs form the interface between farmers and processors. Smallholder 
dairy farmers transport raw milk either to the local cooling centres or the milk chilling centres/hubs 
(MCCs). Local cooling centres are normally satellites of the MCCs or are owned by specific processors. 
Processors collect milk from the cooling centres, MCCs or from roadside collection points. 
 
Of the 5 billion litres of milk produced, 42 percent is consumed at home or sold directly to neighbours 
(Muriuki, 2011). The remaining 58 percent is sold through either formal or informal marketing 
channels. The informal market, consisting of ‘hawkers’ and small shops, accounts for about 32 percent 
of marketed production, while the formal market handles about 26 percent of milk sold (Figure 2). The 
formal milk trade is the market segment licensed by the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB). Licenses are issued 
for milk bars (for up to 1 000 litres/day), cottage industries (up to 3 000 litres/day), mini-dairies (up 
to 5 000 litres/day), processors (above 5 000 litres/day), producers (farmers who process the milk 
themselves) and distributors (who buy for resale). The processors handle about half of the milk bulked 
by cooperatives, the other half being sold to informal outlets or directly to consumers. Data from the 
Kenya Dairy Board indicate that the sector is experiencing a steady growth (Table 3).  
 
 
Table 3 Milk sold through formal marketing channels in Kenya 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Quantity sold, 
million litres 
197 274 340 360 423 399 407 516 549 495 
Source: Kenyan Dairy Board  
 
 
In Kenya, milk processing and distribution is undertaken by farmer-owned cooperatives as well as 
private enterprises. Currently, there are about 54 registered dairy processors, only 34 of which are 
operational. These processors have a combined dairy processing capacity currently standing at 
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2.9 million litres per day. They are, however, operating only at half capacity, their sales accounting for 
only 12 percent of fresh milk sales in urban centres. Demand for pasteurised milk is low because it is 
more expensive than raw milk and moreover, many consumers prefer the taste of unprocessed milk 
(Republic of Kenya, 2013).  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Structure of dairy chain in Kenya, based on Abdulai and Birachi (2009) 
 
 
The milk processing industry is dominated by five companies, namely: Brookside Dairy Ltd 
(38 percent), New Kenya Cooperative Creameries (NKCC) (29 percent), Githunguri Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative Society (Githunguri DFCS) (14 percent), Sameer Agriculture and Livestock Ltd (Daima) 
(4 percent) and Buzeki Dairy Ltd (4 percent). Other medium-level dairies with a significant intake 
include Kinangop, Meru Dairy Cooperative Society, and Kabianga Dairy. Smaller specialist dairies 
include Bio Food Products, Razco Ltd, Raka Cheese, Brown’s Cheese and Alpha Dairy. 
Policy changes in the dairy sector 
Pricing policy in the Kenyan dairy sector has been undergoing major shifts from the time of 
independence to date. Omiti and Muma (2000) give three periods of major shifts of pricing policy since 
1965. 
 
The dairy sector was guided by a milk quota system up to 1971. The government intervened directly 
in the market and with subsidized services (Muriuki, 2011). In this phase, dairy processing and 
marketing was undertaken by independent factories. The next phase in dairy policy was between 1971 
and 1992 and was based on pan-territorial liberalised production. However, also in this period the 
government played an important steering role, with a uniform pricing system. Dairy processing 
developed simultaneously with production through the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (KCC). Until 
1992, KCC was a monopoly with a countrywide network of 11 processing plants and 11 cooling centres 
with 26 sales depots (Omiti and Muma, 2000). In 1992, the dairy industry was liberalised, leading to 
decontrol of producer and consumer prices (Omiti and Muma, 2000).  
 
The institutional framework for the dairy sector includes the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Livestock Development; the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB); the Livestock Development Services 
Milk Producers
Cooperatives and other bulking 
producer organizations
Informal outlets (‘hawkers’, milk 
bars, small shops, hotels)
Cooperative and private milk 
processing firms
Wholesale / retail outlets
Consumers
24%32%
42% 2%
6%
6% 12%
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responsible for extension and regulatory services; the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI); 
and the Kenya Animal Genetics Resources Centre (KAGRC). There is an elaborate legal framework 
within which the sector is regulated. Whereas the policy framework for the dairy industry is the 
responsibility of the national government, the development of the sector, including veterinary and 
extension services, has been devolved to the county governments (Makoni et al., 2014). This 
transition to a devolved governance system has created opportunities and challenges for the 
development of the sector in terms of increasing productivity and competitiveness.  
Value chain coordination mechanisms 
The current regulation governing the dairy sector is the Dairy Industry Act, Chapter 336 of the Laws of 
Kenya. This act allowed the establishment of the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) in 1958. The main 
objectives of the board are to organize, regulate, and develop efficient production, marketing, 
distribution and supply of dairy products. The KDB is governed by a board of directors made up of 
stakeholders drawn from farmers’ associations (e.g. umbrella organizations of dairy cooperative 
societies representing different regions), the government (the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and 
Fisheries) and the private sector, such as processors (e.g. the Kenya Dairy Processors Association) 
and banks. The KDB has branches in Bungoma, Embu, Keticho, Meru, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nyeri, Voi, 
Eldoret, Kakamega, Kisumu, Mombasa, Naivasha, Narok and Thika. The regional branches offer 
licenses to dairy operators. In addition to a fixed licence fee, KDB charges KSh 0.4 per litre of milk 
sold by the operator. 
 
All first-tier primary dairy cooperatives are members of a second-tier regional union of cooperatives 
within their economic region. The unions provide services to member cooperatives, such as enhancing 
links with private processors, assisting the cooperatives in meeting KDB standards of operations and 
linking individual members to input dealers through a credit input supply system as well as to the 
banking sector, usually the Cooperative Bank. 
2.2 Organizational challenges and solutions 
Most of the milk for processing plants is sourced by primary cooperatives that collect it from 
smallholder farmers. Primary cooperatives are the main link in the dairy value chain, through which 
quality requirements of processors are communicated to farmers and where quality control takes 
place. In the absence of a nearby consumer market for raw milk, the cooperative is the main market 
outlet for smallholders’ milk. In some regions, several cooperatives procure from the same 
geographical area, leading to competition in service delivery and off-farm prices. When a consumer 
market is nearby, informal buyers procure milk from farmers to deliver directly to small scale informal 
processors or directly to consumers. These informal traders, or ‘hawkers’, compete directly with the 
cooperatives in terms of prices (paying higher prices), payment modalities (paying directly in cash) 
and quality requirements (lower). Dairy processors source mainly in more remote areas, where prices 
of raw milk are lower (Foreman and de Leeuw, 2012). Interviews with the cooperatives indicated 
several ways to cope with this competition while remaining attractive for farmers and reliable for 
processing plants. A summary of the challenges faced by the dairy cooperatives in Kenya and the 
measures adopted to overcome them is reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4 Main organizational challenges in Kenyan dairy cooperatives 
Challenges Main issues Main initiatives 
 
 
Effective and efficient 
quality assurance 
systems 
Consumers prefer cheaper non-
pasteurised milk 
 
Raw milk adulteration practices 
 
Combining milk from different 
farmers 
 
Delays in delivery to cooling 
tank 
 
Use of preventive antibiotics  
 
Farmers do not receive quality-
based payment 
 
Improve awareness of quality at consumer level: 
• Improve regulation to uphold standards 
• ‘Milk ATMs’ to sell unpacked processed milk 
 
Improve quality at farm level: 
• Increase frequency of collection (twice a day) 
• Impromptu checks by quality assurance team 
• Social control by observer farmers 
• Train farmers in milk handling and storage 
• Apply preventive antibiotics to the herd in shifts 
• Restrict cooperative membership to ‘serious farmers’ 
 
Improve quality and traceability at collection centre: 
• Require use of aluminium containers 
• Apply strong sanctions on adulteration 
• Pay graders to apply control tests 
 
Improve transparency and quality testing at processing plant: 
• Pilot quality-based payment systems 
 
 
Attractive and cost-
efficient payment 
systems 
Higher on-the-spot prices 
offered by ‘hawkers’ 
 
Working capital requirement for 
direct payment 
 
Member commitment 
Shortening the payment period: 
• Emergency payment facilities 
• SACCO / bank transfers 
• Use reserve funds 
• M-Pesa transfers to farmers 
 
Provision of additional services by cooperative: 
• Transport  
• Check-off system for inputs 
• Check-off system for consumer goods (store) 
• Training and advice 
• Health insurance payments 
• Link to bank loans (SACCO) 
• Annual bonus based on quantity of milk delivered 
• Developing product value addition 
 
Increase member commitment 
• Gender-sensitive payment 
• Transparency and rejuvenating leadership 
• Elections in grassroots assemblies 
• Sell shares to raise funds for investments in infrastructure 
 
Challenge 1 – Developing effective and efficient quality assurance systems 
When milk is taken fresh from a cow’s udder, it has very low bacterial counts. As a result of naturally-
occurring anti-bacterial substances in fresh milk, the bacterial counts remain low for 3 to 4 hours (‘lag 
phase’). Thereafter, however, the bacterial content starts to increase logarithmically (‘log phase’), 
doubling every half hour. When fresh milk is mixed with ‘log phase’ milk, e.g. when morning and 
evening milk are mixed in the same milk container on the farm, or if the container or cooling tanks are 
not cleaned properly at the collection centre, all milk in these containers will come into log phase 
immediately. The Kenya Dairy Board indicates that milk quality has improved, but was originally at a 
very low level. Foreman and De Vries (2012) refer to a study in 2005 showing that the milk in five 
sampled collection centres had a bacterial count that was four to five times the upper limit for Grade 
III milk. Other research in 2008 showed that even after being pasteurised, several processed products 
had coliform contamination, indicating poor post-processing hygiene.  
Initiatives to improve awareness of quality at consumer level 
The public is not well informed about the dangers posed by poor food safety practices, and the control 
of food processors is limited, with a large informal sector having no effective food safety monitoring 
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systems. To prevent health problems, most consumers boil the milk before consumption (Muriuki, 
2011). In 2007, the Kenya Bureau of Standards introduced high quality thresholds for milk, 
similar to those used in developed countries, but in practice no milk complies with these norms and 
there are no effective regulations nor sanctions (Ndungu et al., 2016). The standards are set so high 
to counteract eventual market access limitations for dairy exports (Foreman and de Leeuw, 2012). 
 
“ ... at the moment in Kenya much of the milk being processed does not comply with the 
standard and therefore in theory the processors could be prosecuted for use of non-
conforming milk. Grade III milk, given an upper limit of 2.0x106/ml, makes the use for 
processing of milk with higher bacterial counts non-conforming, and therefore technically 
illegal. Elsewhere, standards have sometimes required that high-count milk be used for 
industrial processing and been prohibited for use in the manufacture of fresh dairy 
products. The Kenya/EAC standard does not distinguish between permitted uses for each 
of the grades.” (Foreman and de Leeuw, 2012). 
 
One way to increase the sale of processed milk in urban markets is to reduce packaging costs, as the 
lower consumer price is a decisive factor for the high demand for unprocessed milk. Some processors 
have installed milk dispensers (known as milk ATMs). These dispensers are commonly found in 
supermarkets and milk bars. Most of the dispensers are placed by the company Kinangop Dairies Ltd. 
Some cooperatives, such as Mumberes and Miku Farmers’ Cooperative, have also by-passed the large 
processing companies, and enter the local market with milk ATMs selling raw milk per litre. 
Initiatives to improve quality at farm level 
Most cooperatives indicate that they do not face many quality challenges and that the cases of milk 
rejection are few. However, cooperatives and processors do occasionally reject milk from farmers due 
to acidity, adulteration and mastitis.  
 
“Sometimes, milk spoils fast due to high temperatures in the area. Sometimes farmers 
mix morning and evening milk and this leads to spoilage. Another challenge is that some 
farmers produce small quantities of milk and cannot fill the 50-litre capacity cans. So 
during collection, milk from an area is combined into one can. In case some milk from 
one farmer is adulterated the whole can is adulterated and leads to rejection of all milk 
on only one farmer’s account.” (Interview with Mumberes) 
 
Several cooperatives have started to increase the frequency of raw milk collection. For example, 
Mumberes has started collecting the afternoon milk from farmers that have a substantial production. 
Other cooperatives, including Githunguri, even oblige farmers to deliver milk twice a day. If they fail to 
do so they are fined 20 000 KSh. This severe sanction has been introduced as a complement to 
another control system used by cooperatives: impromptu visits of inspectors or a quality 
assurance team. Githunguri sanctions farmers when water is added, but directly expels members 
who add soda ash. 
 
“The reason for this is that since the society conducts random inspections and very often 
it is then assumed that if a farmer fails to deliver his or her milk it means that he/she is 
trying to avoid being caught by the inspectors. And therefore he is treated the same way 
as that farmer who was caught having adulterated the milk and penalised.” (Interview 
with extension officer of Githunguri). 
 
Impromptu visits by paid staff are cost-efficient in larger cooperatives. Smaller cooperatives have 
introduced systems of social control by peer farmers to prevent adulteration, and other 
cooperatives are still looking for effective means of doing so. 
 
“Currently, any farmer found with adulterated milk is simply told to take back the milk 
without other penalties. However, the cooperative is working on the penalties and fines 
to be charged in case of repeated offences. This is the result of rising number of cases of 
milk adulteration. This gave the cooperative a bad reputation and farmers experienced 
huge losses following milk rejection.” (Interview Sabatia) 
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In addition to adulteration, the presence of antibiotics in the raw milk poses serious quality problems 
for the processor (for processing milk into yoghurt and cheese) and consumers (allergy). The use of 
antibiotics as a preventive medicine is widespread. Several cooperatives organize training to limit 
use of antibiotics and to apply cattle handling methods that reduce the incidence of mastitis and 
other infectious diseases. For example, Ukuu cooperative emphasises the use of separate towels for 
drying the udder of each cow. One cooperative, Cheptiret, instructs its members to apply preventive 
antibiotics only to parts of their herd, and, for some days, only deliver milk from untreated ones. 
The use of antibiotics in shifts guarantees that the farmer has some income and that the amount of 
milk spoilt or used for home consumption is manageable. Cheptiret also restricts its membership to 
‘serious farmers’ having more intensive dairy production, to ensure that they safeguard the milk 
quality.  
Initiatives to improve quality at the collection centre 
Milk adulteration is detected mainly at the cooling centre, using lactometers. Most cooperatives have 
graders to perform this task. Generally a first check is done by the driver who collects the milk (mainly 
by smell) and when the milk enters the cooling centre (pH-test density test). This quality control is 
accompanied by a severe sanction procedure, such as the one followed by Cheptiret cooperative.  
 
“In case it is a worker who had delivered the rejected milk, the worker is given a letter to 
take to the farmer explaining the reasons for the rejection of the milk. The farmer is 
given a warning. In case the milk is rejected three times, the cooperative sends the 
extension officer to the farm to discuss the problem and try to assist the farmer after 
which repeating the same mistake leads to the expulsion from the cooperative. All 
members adhere to these rules.” (Interview Cheptiret) 
 
According to Foreman and de Leeuw (2012) and Ndungu et al. (2016), the quality of the milk 
analysers as currently used in these cooling centres are not suitable for an uncontested quality-based 
payment system, because of the poor stability of calibration and the accuracy and replicability of the 
results obtained. The main interested party in effective quality control is of course the processor. In 
many primary cooperatives, therefore, the staff responsible for the control is paid directly by 
the processing company or the cooperative union. 
Initiatives to improve transparency and quality testing at processing plants 
The Kenya Dairy Board, together with SNV, Land O’Lakes International Development and the Gates 
Foundation, have introduced pilots of quality-based payment systems. The results are still 
meagre, however. A credible quality-based payment system needs a system of control-on-control. 
Foreman and de Leeuw (2012) indicate that processors are not inclined to facilitate external 
inspections in their plant or third-party laboratory checks on their quality control. Quality-based 
payment by processors is also limited to the deliveries from the cooling centre and cannot be 
transferred directly to individual farmers, in the absence of a credible quality control system at the 
level of the collection centre.  
 
In theory, quality-based payment systems may boost quality. Bonuses for high-grade milk can be 
financed from penalties for low-grade milk. Investment in quality control and extension services can 
be paid back from the added value created in processing higher milk quality. However, a context of 
fierce competition with an informal sector that will not apply these quality requirements, combined 
with the higher prices that these informal ‘hawkers’ pay for the raw milk, make it highly unlikely that 
individual farmers can be reached by these quality-based incentives. 
Challenge 2 – Offering attractive and cost-efficient payment systems 
Cooperatives compete both with informal buyers (‘hawkers’) and among themselves. In some areas 
there are several cooperatives, which often, for one reason or other, have split from the same initial 
cooperative (e.g. the case of Ukuu Farmers Dairy Cooperative). Therefore, the loyalty of the member 
to his or her cooperative is always contested and the transactions between the member and the 
cooperative are continuously negotiated. The main issue referred to by farmers in the interviews was 
related to pricing, whereas delayed payment was less important. Payment modalities, however, 
proved a key factor in enabling the cooperatives to reduce their costs. Modern banking systems to pay 
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for the milk have opened up additional services for members, especially in accessing loans from the 
banks to which the dairy cooperatives make monthly payments. 
Initiatives to shorten the payment period 
In all cooperatives, there is a facility for farmers to be paid before the agreed monthly 
payment day, with a credit ceiling based on the value of the milk delivered on that day; the credit is 
then cancelled with the next monthly payment. Longer-term loans are possible from several of the 
cooperatives, e.g. in Muki, Mumbers, Sabatia, Githunguri, because they manage, or work in close 
collaboration with a Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO). In contrast, Cheptiret works with 
any bank at which a farmer has an account. 
 
“When members borrow, this is a personal initiative and arrangement between the 
farmer and his/her respective bank, without the cooperative” (Interview Cheptiret) 
 
All cooperatives have monthly payment systems. While members are usually paid with a month delay, 
Sabatia needs only two days and Cheptiret even pays the farmer before the processors have made the 
transfer, using their reserves as working capital. In practice, farmers are satisfied with these 
monthly payment.  
 
Initially, farmers were paid in cash but the mode of payment is changing, with the majority of farmers 
now being paid through the bank. However, some of the older farmers still insist on being paid in 
cash, because they find it difficult to follow bank procedures and also wish to minimize transaction 
costs. However, paying cash poses a security risk to cooperatives (Interview Ukuu). Muki Farmers’ 
Cooperative introduced a sophisticated payment system based on mobile phone credits: the 
money is deposited in the farmer’s account in Muki SACCO, and transferred to his or her M-Pesa 
(mobile phone payment system) account. The farmer can then withdraw the money from any M-Pesa 
outlet, save it in an M-Shwari saving account, transfer it to another bank account or make purchases 
with it using the Lipa Na M-pesa in shops. 
Initiatives to provide additional services 
The usual way for cooperatives to compensate for lower prices or delayed payments compared with 
‘hawkers’ is to offer additional services. All cooperatives offer their members transport service for 
the milk. Generally, this transport service is offered at no cost, except in the case of Sabatia that 
offers higher prices (around 10 percent) to farmers that supply directly to the collection centre. Most 
cooperatives are multiple-service cooperatives. For example, Muki Dairy Farmers’ Cooperative 
provides an impressive list of services to its members, including training, health insurance, livestock 
insurance, input supply, cash advances, artificial insemination services and end-of-year bonuses. 
 
All cooperatives also use a check-off system for inputs (animal feed, medicine) procured from a 
designated agrovet-shop, generally an economic unit in the cooperative. Especially the larger 
cooperatives can obtain reductions on the prices of these inputs due to economies of scale and 
negotiation power. Membership of the cooperative therefore translates into lower input costs 
compared to non-members.  
 
Githunguri also allows food items bought in the cooperative food store in its check-off system. 
According to a member “this has reduced the incidences of men use all the proceeds from milk leaving 
the family without food.”  
Initiatives to increase member commitment 
The Cheptiret cooperative has an innovative feature in their payment system. To ensure that the 
whole family participates in milk production activities and to ensure empowerment of women, the 
cooperative has a policy that morning milk is recorded in the name of the husband and milk 
delivered in the evening is added to the wife’s account. 
 
“This policy is to ensure women’s empowerment and to reward women who mostly 
participate in dairy activities and it ensures women’s inclusion in the dairy operations.” 
(Interview Cheptiret) 
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To boost member commitment to the rules and regulations within the cooperative, some cooperatives 
mention a need to increase transparency and involve younger farmers in daily management. 
Mumberes Cooperative increased member commitment in the General Assemblies by organizing 
decentralised election in the villages in which the farmers live. 
 
“ ... elections are conducted at the grassroots level and not during Annual General 
Meetings at the headquarters as most cooperatives do. This ensures transparency and 
near 100 percent participation of members. The main reason that informed this change 
was the fact that very few people participated in elections because they had to travel 
long distances. This led to low voter turnout. To make it easier therefore, the voting was 
taken closer to them at the grassroots.” (Interview Mumberes) 
 
Several cooperatives, for example Sabatia, offer special shares to members to pay for new 
infrastructural investment in the cooperative, such as storage facilities. When possible, farmers are 
paid a dividend based on the profit made with the particular investment. Most cooperatives pay a 
bonus for each litre of supplied milk. The bonus is around 5 percent of the price of milk in the case of 
Sabatia and 3 percent in the case of Ukuu Farmers’ Cooperative. 
2.3 Implications for the institutional environment 
Coordination in the dairy chain 
The dairy market in Kenya is highly informal, but the formal sector is well-organized, with a key role 
for the Kenyan Dairy Board and a relatively well-structured cooperative movement. Coordination in 
the dairy chain in Kenya is defined by the type of contracts used in transactions between the 
producers and buyers of milk (Birachi, 2006). Three main coordination mechanisms that were 
identified are spot market, verbal contracts, and written contracts. The informal market mostly relies 
on spot market and producers get cash immediately to offset their expenses and meet their needs. 
Prices paid in the informal market are also slightly higher than those paid by cooperatives.  
 
A disadvantage for farmers selling in the informal market is that they do not benefit from quality feeds 
and other services provided by the cooperative. Some cooperatives, for instance Muki Farmers’ 
Cooperative, have loose contracts with producers, whereby producers supply milk to the cooperative 
but can sell to other cooperatives if they so wish. In the Githunguri Dairy Cooperative, however, 
member producers are not allowed to sell to other cooperatives. The producers supplying milk to 
cooperatives have the advantage of receiving a lump-sum payment at the end of the month as well as 
benefiting from other services such as loans, training, extension services as well as inputs at 
subsidized rates. 
 
Some of the cooperatives, including Muki Dairy Farmers Cooperative and Githunguri Dairy Farmers 
Cooperative, organize the processing and marketing themselves – a strategy of vertical integration. 
These cooperatives bulk the milk from producers, process it into various dairy products and sell these 
products under their own brand names. They set prices and quality standards as well as minimum 
delivery quantities. The cooperatives undertake the function of input suppliers as well. The ability of 
milk producers to join together to form a cooperative is a form of horizontal coordination. This enables 
the producers to benefit in terms of collective action, reducing their transaction costs. 
 
Moreover, in Kenya there is the emergence of horizontal coordination between dairy marketing 
groups, as seen in the case of Baringo Agricultural Marketing Services Cooperative Services 
(BAMSCOS), Meru Central Dairy Cooperative Union and North Rift Cooperative Organization. These 
regional unions bring together primary cooperatives and provide services to members. Examples of 
such services include enhancing links with private processors, assisting the cooperatives in meeting 
the KDB standards of operations and linking individual members to input dealers or stockists through a 
credit input supply system as well as through the banking sector, usually the Cooperative Bank. 
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Financial instruments and capacity development programmes  
The goal of ensuring that quality milk is supplied to the cooperatives has not been fully realized in 
Kenya. Milk delivered to processors is often adulterated with water and other additives and does not 
meet the microbial standards set by the Kenya Dairy Board and the Kenya Bureau of Standards. This 
is due to the fact that most farmers cannot afford the necessary transport equipment or the milk 
testing equipment. However, several programmes are under way to achieve this. Under Feed the 
Future programme, USAID trains bank employees on best practices for “value chain lending,” or 
providing financial services to farmers, suppliers, processors, and buyers all across a given sector to 
reduce the costs and risks of doing business. The most successful partnership resulting from this effort 
has been with Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), the largest Kenyan bank in assets. Sixty-four KCB 
employees have been trained in value chain lending and approximately US$ 9 million in loans have 
been issued in the dairy sector since January 2012 across the 32 KCB branches. The partnership is 
supporting the roll-out of two new financial products: a dairy herd loan and an asset finance loan. 
 
Another programme is the Kenya Market-led Dairy Programme (KDMP), funded by the Netherlands 
Embassy in Kenya and carried out by SNV. This intervention aims to facilitate processors to pilot 
quality-based milk payment systems (QBMP), by providing technical advice and other support. This is 
done in collaboration with the Kenya Dairy Board. The proposed system aims to utilize the existing 
milk testing facilities at collection centres and at processing plants, with the provision of additional 
testing equipment. Bulking centres have been the main focal point for this work, with various NGO 
project investments in the rehabilitation and provision of milk cooling tanks, purchase of hygienic dairy 
equipment, provision of business management training, and other improvements needed to make 
formal-sector marketing and business development more effective and attractive.  
 
Moreover, in 2008, the Gates Foundation launched the East Africa Dairy Development (EADD) Project. 
The EADD strategy follows the “milk hub” approach, which uses milk-bulking centres as the focal 
points around which business development linkages are created between farmers, buyers and inputs 
suppliers, thereby creating a web of market links. The milk hub development strategy focuses 
attention on bulking centres as a business enterprise and provider of services needed to support dairy 
production. The objective is to promote stable market systems that are attractive to farmers because 
of the services offered. This, in turn, allows the hub to create marketing relationships with dairy 
processors as purchasers of the milk, and so open the way to accessing other benefits including the 
ability to mobilize private finance for investments in cooling tanks and other infrastructure needed for 
the growth and development of the cooperatives. 
 
Currently, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries is planning to provide 1 000 cooling 
machines as part of an effort to enhance the sale of quality milk. These milk cooling machines are part 
of a KSh 10 billion grant package from the Dutch Government to mechanise Kenya’s dairy sector and 
will be supplied to dairy cooperative societies. Additionally, the Kenya Dairy Board will train milk 
“hawkers” and issue them practicing licences. The licensing is aimed at promoting good handling of 
milk, in order to curb diseases resulting from the consumption of bad milk. The Ministry is focusing on 
ensuring that hawked milk is processed, in order to make it safer and make the informal milk trade 
acceptable. For example, as of August 2016, informal traders will be able to purchase pasteurised milk 
from a centralised point and then sell it to other market segments. 
Institutional support for effective smallholder collective action 
The ability of dairy cooperatives to offer better services to their members depends on the broader 
policy and institutional environment. The main role of the Government of Kenya is to create a 
conducive environment for private sector investment in milk production, processing, marketing and 
delivery of key support services. This function is carried out by KDB in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, the mandate being to improve the producer price of milk, lower 
the consumer price and increase milk intake by processors (Tuei, 2010)).  
 
Since 2003, the Government of Kenya has put in place several measures to revive the dairy industry, 
such as restructuring and capacity building of the Kenya Dairy Board; revival and strengthening of the 
New KCC and the Agricultural Finance Cooperation (AFC); review of dairy policies and regulations; and 
encouragement of development partners and the private sector to provide more resources to the 
 Wageningen Economic Research Report 2016-088 | 25 
industry. This has translated into increased public and donor investment in the dairy sector, and 
cooperatives have been strengthened in their capacities to collectively bulk and sell milk and access 
extension services.  
 
The dairy sector is able to influence Kenyan public policy by analysing and proposing regulations that 
constrain growth and quality upgrading. For example, the Kenyan Market-led Dairy Programme, 
supported by SNV and Embassy of The Netherlands, engages with policy and opinion makers to 
identify or address issues such as fiscal policies regarding tax exemptions for dairy equipment and 
liquid processed milk, regulation of the raw milk market, the introduction of standards for the dairy 
industry, the development of standards for milk fortification, piloting of new energy- and protein- rich 
fodder seeds, the regulations regarding the import of heifers, and the institutional environment for 
practical dairy training. 
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3 Organizational and institutional 
challenges for Moroccan dairy 
cooperatives 
3.1 Institutional context 
Structure of the dairy value chain 
The dairy chain in Morocco is one of the main animal production chains of the country. It is particularly 
important from a socio-economic, employment, as well as a nutritional point of view, given the range 
of dairy products destined for consumption (Sraïri, 2011). The dairy sector in Morocco generates close 
to US$ 800 million annually. More than 300 000 full-time producers and approximately 
100 000 seasonal producers earn their living from dairy farming. The dairy chain in Morocco is 
characterized by a duality. On the one hand, there are strong players mainly represented by private 
processing groups and large multinationals such as Centrale Danone, whose capital is almost totally 
controlled by the global player Danone (96 percent of its capital); on the other hand, cooperatives 
such as Safilait and Les Domaines Agricoles are progressing rapidly, as is COPAG 
(Coopérative Agricole d’Agrumes), a large cooperative group in southern Morocco (Figure 3). Centrale 
Danone is currently the leading dairy agro-business firm in Morocco as it processes up to 30 percent of 
the total raw milk volumes produced annually throughout the country. 
 
Approximately 65 percent of milk production in Morocco goes through the formal sector, whereas 
13 percent goes through informal channels. The remaining 22 percent is used on-farm for self-
consumption (Sraïri et al., 2013)}. Milk deliveries to dairy collection cooperatives, which are further 
processed by the industrial societies, are crucial for the supply of milk to large urban centres, as 
imports are quite limited (less than 15 percent of the total amount of milk consumed in the country is 
imported).  
 
The dairy sector depends heavily on rainfall, which has a direct impact on fodder production. There are 
agro-ecological challenges due to limited water supplies, as the annual water availability per capita 
stands at about 750 m3. Water shortages and the impacts of climate change may affect animal 
products such as milk and meat, both of which have important water requirements (Hoekstra, 2012). 
Therefore, 65 percent of milk production is concentrated in regions having large-scale irrigation 
schemes. This issue constitutes a real challenge for the future of intensive dairying in Morocco, given 
the increasing demand of water by the agricultural sector and the competition between agricultural 
commodities for this resource. Recent research shows that the water footprint for a single kg of milk 
under irrigated conditions in Morocco is almost 1.6 cubic meters (Sraïri et al., 2016). 
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Figure 3 Structure of the dairy chain in Morocco (based on: Sraïri et al., 2013) 
 
Policy changes in the dairy sector 
The current structure of the Moroccan dairy industry is the result of an historical process consisting of 
roughly five phases:: 
1. At Independence in 1956, the sector was entirely driven by the government, as investments rarely 
involved foreigners. The dairy value chain was disorganized and dairy farmers were dispersed. 
Distribution ranges were short, as the dairy industry was still embryonic and cities were mainly 
supplied directly from neighbouring farms. 
2. The 1970s marked a turning point, with the adoption of a national dairy policy, focusing on the 
most favourable areas of the country in which large-scale irrigation schemes were developed. The 
Ministry of Agriculture then launched a strategy called the ‘Dairy plan’, mainly aimed at 
strengthening the Moroccan dairy value chain from production to processing and consumption. 
This strategy was backed with a series of positive incentive measures such as heavy taxes on 
imported milk powder and support to farmgate milk prices, which then represented 75 percent of 
the consumer price. This policy led to a duality between production and consumption areas. The 
former are located near the mountain areas (and dams) of the central and eastern parts of the 
country, whereas the latter are mainly near large urban centres along the Atlantic coast. This 
geographical separation results in relatively high transportation and processing costs of milk 
before it can be distributed for consumption.  
3. The third phase, in the 1980s, was marked by Structural Adjustment Programmes, which came 
into force in 1983. These hailed a liberalization of the economy, which led to the withdrawal of 
public policies and resulted in significant budget cuts affecting various existing agricultural 
incentives. Prices of most feed concentrates in livestock farms soared. By the mid-1980s, State-
owned dairy cattle farms had been dismantled. On the positive side, smallholders adopted the idea 
of diversifying their sources of income by rearing cattle of imported origin with higher milk yields. 
The progressive disengagement of the State from the dairy sector during these years resulted in 
the emergence of private operators, including the farmers themselves, advocating for the sector 
with a collective voice. In this period, public authorities encouraged the creation of professional 
associations. In 1988, the National Cattle Breeders’ Association (Association Nationale d’Eleveurs 
Bovins- ANEB) was established, bringing together representatives from various regions throughout 
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the country. ANEB took over some of the previously publically provided extension services, such 
as artificial insemination, record keeping, etc. 
4. In 1992, the total liberalization of milk prices throughout the value chain marked the fourth phase 
of the evolution of the dairy sector. This induced a process in which farmgate milk prices 
stagnated while consumer milk prices steadily increased (Table 5). This created room for the 
emergence of informal milk collection circuits to supply neighbouring large cities, particularly in 
the northwestern part of the country along the Atlantic coast (cities such as Casablanca, Rabat 
and Kenitra). The raw milk was sold in small shops known locally as Mahlabates. Overall, the 
sector has kept on growing steadily to meet increasing domestic demand.  
 
 
Table 5 Milk prices in Morocco, 1995-2015  
Year Farm gate price 
(DH/litre) 
Farmgate price 
(US $/litre) 
Consumer milk 
price (DH/litre) 
Consumer milk 
price (US 
$/litre) 
Share of farm gate price in 
final consumer milk price 
(%) 
1995 2.94 0.33 5.00 0.55 58.8 
2000 2.94 0.33 5.40 0.60 54.4 
2005 2.94 0.33 6.20 0.69 47.4 
2010 3.00 0.33 6.40 0.71 46.9 
2015 3.40 0.37 7.00 0.77 48.6 
Source: Sraïri (2015) 
 
 
5. The fifth phase started in 2008, when the government intended to re-articulate the dairy chain. 
Since then, dairy production has been supported by the Green Morocco Plan. Moroccan authorities 
have reiterated their commitment to the agricultural sector and to producers. The recombination 
of imported milk powder is marginal because of high duties on imported milk powder and dairy 
derivatives. Imports may occur in periods of drought and also to cover an occasional increase in 
demand, such as during the holy month of Ramadan. In 2013, the government increased farmgate 
prices by 5 percent (from US$ 0.33 to US$ 0.35 per litre) following a 9 percent increase in the 
price of milk by the leading dairy company, Centrale Danone. In May 2014, this company also 
imposed a 10 percent consumer price increase for yogurt and cottage cheese.  
Value chain coordination 
The establishment of the Green Morocco Plan in 2008 prompted the need for each commodity chain to 
create its own governing body to represent operators in the sector. As a result, FIMALAIT, the 
Moroccan Inter-professional Dairy Federation, was created in 2009. This inter-professional body brings 
together members of cattle breeders’ associations, milk collectors and dairy processors. 
 
FIMALAIT is the only legitimate body to represent the dairy chain. It is eligible for receiving public 
funds for programmes dedicated to the development of the dairy chain. The first meeting of FIMALAIT 
also included representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture. During its formation, the organization 
exposed a number of trust-related issues among actors, which were due to a lack of clear governance 
mechanisms. For example according to ANEB, some dairy processors had not accepted the idea of 
discussing sensitive issues regarding the dairy chain. In addition, Centrale Danone insisted on having 
its own group of dairy farmer suppliers (namely the Féderation Nationale des Producteurs Laitiers - 
FNPL) to be represented within FIMALAIT instead of ANEB being the only representative of cattle 
breeders at the national level. Thereafter, with the intervention of State authorities, ANEB and FNPL 
merged to form FENEPROL (Fédération Nationale des Eleveurs Producteurs Laitiers), which then 
became the only representative body of dairy farmers at the national level. On the dairy processing 
side, private companies as well as dairy processing cooperatives formed the Fédération Nationale des 
Industriels Laitiers (FNIL) and this entity is also represented within FIMALAIT. Ultimately, FENEPROL 
and FNIL joined to form FIMALAIT. 
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3.2 Organizational challenges and solutions 
This research focuses on two outcome areas: milk quality and organizational efficiency. A summary of 
the challenges faced by the dairy cooperatives in Morocco and the measures adopted to overcome 
them is reported in Table 6. 
Challenge 1 – Developing and applying effective and efficient quality assurance systems 
The quality of raw milk is low in Morocco, mainly because of poor hygiene (i.e. the level of contamination 
by microorganisms in the milk). Another critical issue related to milk in Morocco is residues of antibiotics, 
which results both in important quantities of unsold milk and also food safety issues.  
 
 
Table 6 Main organizational challenges in Moroccan dairy cooperatives 
Challenges Main issues Main initiatives 
 
 
Effective and efficient 
quality assurance 
systems 
Food safety risk for consumers 
 
Low milk quality for processing 
 
Lack of understanding of the concept 
of milk quality by dairy farmers 
 
Segmented milk collection networks 
(peddlers, buyers) which prevent 
quality-defined milk pricing 
 
Improve awareness of quality at consumer level: 
• Coordinated media campaigns 
 
Improve quality at farm level: 
• Boost capacity development programmes and 
infrastructure 
• Fining fraudulent behaviour as part of rules and 
procedures 
• Increasing frequency of milk collection 
• Using aluminium cans to transport milk to the 
cooperative collection centre 
 
Improve quality and traceability at collection centre: 
• Separation of peddler-provided milk 
• Improvements in cleaning of cooling tanks 
• Payment of contaminated milk from the cooperative to 
farmers as an incentive not to deliver it to the client 
processor 
• Investments in quality control devices 
• Regular testing of raw milk density 
 
Improve transparency in quality testing at processing 
plant: 
• Fair use of quality tests by processing plant 
• Agribusiness providing cooperatives with devices for 
quality testing 
• Public Investments in accredited laboratories 
 
 
Attractive and cost-
efficient payment 
systems 
Need for transparency of payment 
prices (premium & penalties) from 
farmer to cooperative and cooperative 
to processor. 
 
Delayed payment by cooperatives to 
farmers versus cash payment by 
‘peddlers’. 
 
Informal milk collection circuits create 
unfair price competition for 
cooperatives and agri-business 
 
Shortening the payment period: 
• Rapid payment system in cash or bank transfer 
according to milk volumes delivered 
• Increase bankability of farmers 
 
Provision of additional services as cooperative: 
• Provide transport to collect the milk on the farm 
• Financing social protection services 
• Developing product value addition 
 
Increase member commitment: 
• Reduce the incidence of private peddlers in milk 
deliveries to cooperatives 
 
 
All stakeholders in the dairy chain acknowledge that on-farm investments and better handling 
practices are needed to improve milk quality. Nevertheless, the price incentives for quality that are 
paid by the processors are not translated into quality-differentiated prices at farm-level. Payments to 
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farmers are based on volumes delivered rather than on the quality of milk. This implies that farmers 
lack incentives and reward mechanisms to produce quality milk (Sraïri et al., 2009). This lack of price 
incentive for milk quality is difficult to address, given that the offer of raw milk from smallholder 
farmers is fragmented. Small volumes of milk are delivered daily by smallholders to 2 250 small 
collection cooperatives throughout the country, before supplying the processing units. Dairy farmers 
can switch easily between buyers, and are free to sell to informal peddlers or other cooperatives that 
collect milk in the area if these pay a better price or apply lower quality standards. Especially in the 
dairy basins located close to the large cities, there are multiple private peddlers who collect milk from 
the farms and deliver it to the cooperatives. These peddlers mix the milk collected from several farms, 
making it difficult to avoid contamination or implement efficient tracing systems. 
 
In general, farmers are perceived as not being sufficiently aware of the consequences of antibiotic 
residues in raw milk for further processing. According to interviews by the Al Badre cooperative, for 
most farmers the notion of milk quality remains insufficiently understood due to the numerous 
parameters it consists of (hygienic, chemical and physical). They feel that there is a lack of clarity on 
the criteria used to measure milk quality. Moreover, the premium paid by the processing client to the 
cooperative for improved milk quality does not reach individual farmers despite their efforts to comply 
with these requirements, for instance by using aluminium cans. 
Initiatives to improve awareness of quality at consumer level 
Coordinated efforts of the stakeholders in the dairy value chain, organized in FIMALAIT invest in 
publicity and media coverage to increase processed dairy consumption. The dairy sector has 
recently suffered from bad publicity related to the quality of dairy products and the assumption of a 
negative effect of dairy consumption on human health, such as increased risks of cancer. 
Unfortunately, this issue was exacerbated in 2015, just at a time when there was an overproduction 
because of climate conditions. With a view to rebuilding the reputation of the sector and solving the 
issue of reduced dairy product sales, the interprofessional organization FIMALAIT launched a large 
campaign that included scientific conferences and television advertisements, aimed at promoting the 
consumption of dairy products. 
Initiatives to improve quality at farm level 
The Al Mouna collection cooperative has increased the frequency of milk recollection. However, 
these measures alone are not considered sufficient to guarantee the required milk quality. Therefore, 
the Al Fouarate cooperative has moreover requested its members to use only aluminium cans to 
transport the milk from the farm to the collection centre, in order to meet the requirements of its 
client (i.e. Centrale Danone) with regard to milk quality. However, this measure did not reach a 
consensus among all farmers because of the high cost and heavy weight of the cans. 
Initiatives to improve quality and traceability at the collection centre 
As one of the more obvious organizational solutions, the Al Fouarate cooperative started to separate 
the milk delivered by peddlers from the batches coming from private farms. This improves 
traceability and facilitates coordination with members on quality issues. 
 
In order to deliver quality milk, many of the cooperatives studied improved washing of the milk 
tanks with specially developed disinfection methods. Al Badre cooperative, for instance, bought 
a high-pressure cleaner to clean the tank. The Al Mouna cooperative uses a product called “Easy Foam 
VF 32” provided by its client, the dairy plant Safilait.  
 
Al Mouna cooperative has established a system of mandatory milk collection twice a day with 
frequent measurements of raw milk density and a daily testing of antibiotic residues. This 
system enables the cooperative to meet the dairy plant’s quality requirements. But even when the 
collection cooperative puts in place these more sophisticated systems of testing for antibiotic residues, 
acidity and density, as in the case of Al Mouna and Al Fouarate, the testing is not conducted 
systematically, because of cost issues. In practice, the tests were only applied on samples from those 
farms at which cooperative managers suspected fraudulent behaviour. 
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As a rare exception, one of the cooperatives preferred to remunerate member farmers for milk that 
cannot be delivered to the processing firm. Since 2013, the Al Badre cooperative has adopted the 
principle of paying its farmer members for the volumes of milk containing antibiotic residues 
as an incentive not to deliver it to the cooperative and hence not to spoil the quality of the 
remaining milk delivered to the final client (processing cooperative or company). 
 
FIMALAIT is currently preparing a programme in collaboration with the National Office of Sanitary 
Security of Food Products (Office National de la Sécurité Sanitaire des produits Alimentaires - ONSSA-) 
to strengthen the capacities of the staff operating in milk collection centres. Some 340 collection 
centres out of 2 550 have been identified as needing specific support to make sure that they 
comply with international standards. Water quality is considered to be an important issue to 
facilitate cleaning of the cooling tanks in the centres, and equipment is needed for milk quality 
analysis. 
Initiatives to improve transparency and quality testing at processing plant 
In several cooperatives, including Al Badre, both the top management and the members complain 
about the lack of transparency of the evaluation system for milk quality. In fact, the criteria used to 
evaluate milk quality are imposed by the dairy processor, who is the only operator with equipment for 
laboratory analysis, and therefore the cooperative members have no say in the definition of 
criteria and no way as to dispute the test results. In fact, dairy processing units use the issue of 
milk contamination by antibiotics to avoid collecting all the raw milk supplied by farmers. As a single 
batch from a farm that has treated a sick cow with antibiotics can contaminate the entire milk tank in 
a collection cooperative, dairy processing companies use this argument to reject raw milk, and this 
allows them to avoid paying farmers. Such a situation is often seen in cases of milk excesses, which 
leads to members of collection cooperatives having to find alternative outlets for their milk, such as 
informal milk markets in suburban areas, often at lower prices. 
 
The cooperative Al Fouarate had good but short-lived experiences in controlling the processors’ 
laboratory results using laboratory equipment provided by the processor. In 2012, the dairy 
processor sold to Al Fouarate a rather costly (US$ 1 500) miniature laboratory called Milkoscan, which 
performed rapid routine tests on the chemical quality of raw milk. This milk quality assessment system 
resulted in improvements in milk traceability, allowing a rapid identification of batches with limited fat 
contents or inadequate solid non-fat contents. It also allowed a stabilisation of raw milk prices paid to 
the cooperative, as the members of the cooperative had a reliable tool to challenge the results of the 
tests that were carried out by the processor. However, this system came to an end when the device 
broke down for lack of maintenance. The cooperative could not afford to buy new equipment as 
advised by Centrale Danone. Also with a view to increasing traceability, the Al Fouarate cooperative 
purchased a Gerber centrifugation machine that determines milk fat content. However, given the 
complex and dangerous manipulation of chemicals such as sulphuric acid, as well as the time-
consuming analyses (more than 30 minutes for a single sample), use of this device was abandoned. 
 
FIMALAIT is also planning to create specialised accredited laboratories dedicated to milk 
quality analysis. This requires good governance and a feeling of adequate collaboration within the 
dairy chain. Currently, there is the intention to develop three laboratories in the most prominent 
regions of dairy farming in Morocco, namely Doukkala, the Gharb and the Tadla regions, which 
currently represent 60 percent of the national raw milk output. These regions are expected to become 
more prominent, as they have water availability allowing a better, sustainable development of dairy 
farming than in water stressed areas. 
Challenge 2 –Offering attractive and cost-efficient payment systems 
The liberalization trend has induced authorities to encourage private peddlers to deliver raw milk 
collected directly to private factories through their private collection centres. This situation creates 
fierce competition between cooperatives and private peddlers. As a result, the dairy sector in Morocco 
is characterized by a segmented supply, given the large number of small and family producers 
delivering small quantities of milk. This makes it difficult to introduce payment systems at farmgate 
level that reflect quality-based prices for milk (Sraïri, 2007).  
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At the three collection cooperatives Al Moun, Al Badre and Al Fouarate, farmers are paid every 
2 weeks for the raw milk they have delivered. Therefore, these cooperatives find themselves in a 
delicate financial situation, with treasury imbalances, as they have to advance the money to pay the 
suppliers (farmers) until they are paid by their clients, the dairy processing firms (in this case Centrale 
Danone for Al Badre and Al Fouarate and Safilait for Al Mouna). This may drive cooperatives to 
negotiate agreements with banks to obtain financial facilities such as overdraft authorizations. As a 
result, the cooperatives are confronted with weak business margins. This situation is most acute 
during low production periods when overheads (salaries, electricity bills, transport, procurement of 
material) sometimes exceed incomes from milk sales. “Business is highly seasonal” was expressed by 
interviewees from the Al Mouna and Al Fouarate cooperatives. Both suffer from this seasonality 
because they are located in areas where irrigation facilities are limited and are therefore subjected to 
periods of severe fodder shortages and reduced raw milk output.  
Initiatives to shorten the payment period 
Because private companies are required to pay taxes, whereas cooperatives are not, the price for milk 
paid by private peddlers is generally lower than that of the cooperatives. Nevertheless, farmers are 
increasingly supplying private peddlers. There are several reasons for this: private peddlers are not as 
demanding as cooperatives are with respect to the quality of raw milk and peddlers collect the raw 
milk directly from farms using pick-up trucks. Furthermore, farmers are paid on a daily basis by 
private peddlers instead of having to wait for two weeks when supplying a cooperative. Different 
payment systems are being put into place by cooperatives to reduce the delayed payment period for 
farmers. For instance, the Al Badre cooperative ensures rapid payment of its farmers on a regular 
basis at the end of each week, according to the volume of milk delivered. The cooperative has also 
developed the option of paying farmers through bank transfers. However, this modern payment 
system is not accepted by all farmer members – in the case of Al Badre and Al Mouna, the 
majority still prefer receiving cash. 
Initiatives to provide additional services 
Private peddlers collect milk with pick-up trucks from the location were the farmer has his dairy farm. 
To remain attractive, most cooperatives have arranged transport to collect the milk, or use 
private peddlers (who are sometimes also cooperative members) to do that for them.  
 
Some cooperatives have been developing social services for their members. Al Badre cooperative for 
instance has managed to implement financial activities with social benefits for the whole 
village community. In 2008, this cooperative bought an ambulance for the village, and the 
cooperative built a school and a small clinic. The cooperative also initially financed a private medical 
insurance plan costing its members US$ 60 per year. This medical plan unfortunately came to an end 
after the insurance company decided to triple the premium. 
 
Value addition is a way for farmers to increase their income. For example, farmers from the Al Badre 
cooperative started a movement to transform raw milk into value-added dairy products such as 
mozzarella cheese. However, this initiative remained at the individual level instead of becoming a 
cooperative activity, as the top management of the cooperative did not manage to find a reliable client 
to buy the overall output of cheese on a daily basis, all year long. Contacts are still being established 
with restaurants located in the city of Casablanca to try to sell the daily output of mozzarella at good 
prices. 
3.3 Implications for the institutional environment 
In view of the two main organizational challenges that hinder the marketing capacity of the 
cooperatives, as well as the solutions that they found to address them, we have singled out some key 
findings that deserve further analysis. 
Coordination in the dairy chain 
The reason for not remunerating farmers who comply with quality requirements (high fat and protein 
contents and low microbial contamination) is the fact that the samples assessed by the dairy 
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processing firms (in this case Safilait and Centrale Danone) are taken from milk pooled from all 
cooperative members, who form a heterogeneous group of producers. Therefore, payments to farmers 
are based on volumes delivered rather than on quality (Sraïri et al., 2009). For example, the 
Colait/Extralait dairy processing cooperative, located in the suburbs of the Kenitra city, is mainly 
supplied through its 91 collection centres. These centres are however tempted to deliver their supply 
to competing processors (i.e. Centrale Danone or COPAG), whenever Colait/Extralait tries to 
implement stricter controls on milk quality. Therefore, a long- term effort is underway to establish a 
relationship with top managers of milk collection cooperatives based on trust.  
 
The Colait/Extralait cooperative continues to suffer from unfair competition from milk peddlers 
supplying the mainly informal milk processing networks, given the proximity of several important 
urban centres, including the conurbation of Kenitra-Salé-Rabat (population 3 million). This situation 
creates unfair competition with formal milk collection circuits. However, these shorter circuits seem to 
accommodate both farmers and consumers – farmers sell directly to small shops without having to 
comply with complicated procedures of quality and payment, and consumers buy milk and some 
traditional dairy preparations (milk fat, locally known as lben, or yogurts called raib) at lower prices 
from the Mahlabates. In addition, the circuits are tolerated by local authorities given the crucial social 
and economic roles that they play. In fact, they provide steady incomes for a large number of families. 
Financial instruments and capacity development programmes  
Despite some efforts by the milk collecting cooperatives to enhance milk quality and meet the 
requirements of the private dairy processors, in most cases the measures implemented are either 
costly (aluminium cans, quality testing devices) or unsustainable (devices not easy to maintain, unfair 
competition from informal circuits). The cooperatives’ leeway in improving the milk quality of 
deliveries is therefore limited.  
 
The lack of financial instruments to facilitate investments in adequate quality assurance equipment 
and capacity development programmes on quality-related issues acts as an impediment for these 
cooperatives to improve milk quality for the private processors and thereby to provide a decent 
quality-related remuneration for their members. Support for the cooperatives to invest in long-term, 
high-quality equipment is urgently needed (Sraïri, 2011).  
Institutional support for effective smallholder collective action 
The study revealed that the cooperatives perceive a lack of support on the part of the institutional 
environment, and in particular of current state policies vis-à-vis smallholders and their cooperatives. 
According to the interviewed persons, the Green Morocco Plan foresees measures for supporting 
collective action, but these do not sufficiently reach smallholder cooperatives. The ANEB and 
Al Fouarate representatives interviewed pointed out that support measures to smallholder farmer 
organizations allocated by the Green Morocco Plan through FIMALAIT were not sufficiently 
implemented. An annual budget of DH 15 million (approximately US$ 1.5 million) has now been 
allocated to the dairy chain through FIMALAIT, after a 5-year delay in disbursement. Another 
DH 55 million/year (approximately US$ 5.5 million/year) has been promised but not yet made 
available to the dairy chain operators and in particular to farmers.  
 
FIMALAIT is planning to convene a meeting with board members to decide on how best to use the 
DH 15 million per year. There is a certain lack of trust within the interprofessional FIMALAIT and also 
towards cooperative managers. Mistrust is partly due to the unclear governance structure within 
FIMALAIT and the weight of farmers’ representatives with regard to the dairy processing units, and 
unbalanced power relations between actors in the chain. The director of Centrale Danone was elected 
as the first president of FIMALAIT, with the support of the Ministry of Agriculture, despite ANEB’s initial 
reservations. After convening a crisis meeting in 2013, in a context marked by soaring milk powder 
prices on global markets, FIMALAIT requested the national authorities to intervene through an 
increase in milk prices throughout the dairy chain (from farmgate to consumption). In August 2013, 
national authorities responded favourably to the request with price increases shared between dairy 
processors and dairy farmers.  
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The main challenge for FIMALAIT is to allow the emergence of members capable of advocating the 
interests of all the actors of the dairy chain in a balanced way. FIMALAIT is currently in the process of 
obtaining final approval from public authorities to be recognized as the only representative body of the 
dairy chain in Morocco. Another challenge of this body which is expected to play a major role both at 
national as well as at decentralized level, is to obtain a budget that will allow it to better function. 
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4 Comparative analysis and 
recommendations 
In their ambition to be effective marketing organizations for their members, cooperatives face several 
organizational challenges related to a quality control system that induces farmers to enhance milk 
quality and to an effective payment scheme that aligns farmers’ demand for direct payment for milk 
deliveries with the cooperative’s need for working capital. The main research question of this report 
has been “What is the influence of the external environment on how dairy cooperatives deal with two 
organizational challenges?” The preceding chapters have shown that both in Kenya and in Morocco, 
the answer to the main research question is not straightforward, as the characteristics and strategies 
of the various cooperatives differ. In addition, the two countries, while having some commonalities, 
are quite different in terms of the extent and type of support dairy cooperatives receive from the 
institutional environment.  
 
In order to obtain more clarity on the degree of support provided by the institutional environment to 
selected dairy cooperatives in Kenya and Morocco and for the sake of this comparative analysis, we 
have identified three broad areas: strengthening the internal organization of the cooperative sector, 
improving policies and public regulation, and facilitating multi-stakeholder platforms to discuss, 
propose and implement these enabling policies. For each of these three issues, some 
recommendations are suggested to policy makers to improve the institutional environment for dairy 
cooperatives in Kenya and Morocco.  
4.1 Cooperative strengthening and self-organization 
The case studies showed that dairy cooperatives in Kenya and Morocco are quite different in their 
activities, organization and role in the value chain. For instance, in Morocco, 65% of all milk is 
collected by cooperatives and processed in the formal dairy chain. In Kenya, only 25% of all milk goes 
into the formal chain, with cooperatives accounting for the largest share of this milk handling. As to 
the organizational set-up, the first-tier, primary collection cooperatives in Kenya resemble the 
archetypical multi-purpose cooperative, which provides multiple services to its members, thereby 
creating commitment. Kenyan dairy cooperatives handle milk only from their members. Although the 
system is not perfect, as the 50-litre aluminium milk can is sometimes filled with milk from different 
farmers in the village, the formal value chain for processed milk is in a good starting position to 
address the necessary quality improvement. 
 
The primary cooperatives in Morocco, however, do not have clear user-boundaries, as they may 
handle milk from members acting as ‘peddlers’, collecting milk from other members and non-members 
alike, as well as from other informal peddlers. This practice of buying from multiple suppliers, who 
often collect milk from different farmers in one container, limits traceability and quality control and 
weakens farmer loyalty and their willingness to invest in their cooperative. 
 
Currently, in both countries, cooperative milk collection centres represent suitable organizations to 
provide technical support to dairy farmers, given their geographic and human proximity to farmers. 
This is especially important for farmers who own high-productivity breeds, as they need adequate 
knowledge on feed formulation and hygienic practices for a higher milk yield and quality. However, the 
key question is, who is to pay for this technical assistance? Farmers are only willing to pay for this 
support if it clearly leads to a higher income, from selling more volume or higher quality. If 
cooperatives, as service providers to their members, finance the support activities from their own 
budget, they need either to charge their members individually or they need to retain a part of the milk 
payment for this purpose. In Kenya, a promising development is the establishment of dairy hubs that 
provide training services and inputs to dairy farmers. These hubs are the outcome of a strategy 
developed by the Kenyan Government, donors (the Gates Foundation) and development NGOs 
(notably Heifer International) and a number of other partners. The cooperatives we studied illustrate 
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the scale and level of service provision that these hubs may provide. In Morocco, such a dairy hub 
development would need more time to be established. Initially, the existing primary cooperatives 
would need to strengthen their internal organizational capacities and efficiency as well as the quality 
of their bulking services. Whereas Kenyan dairy cooperatives and hubs work with dedicated processing 
partners, the weaker internal coordination and transparency in the dairy chain in Morocco makes it 
less likely that the processing industry will invest in technical upgrading of primary cooperatives. 
4.2 Public support and regulation 
Evidence and experience show that public support and regulation are often needed for cooperatives to be 
established and to become legitimate organizations. Public support may include subsidies and fiscal 
incentives, education, training and special community activities (Gijselinckx and Bussels, 2014). 
However, interventionist approaches often create dependencies upon external agents, at the expense of 
autonomy, empowerment, social cohesion and financial responsibility (Thorp et al., 2005). Therefore, 
while public support may be needed in the initial phases of establishing cooperatives, they should be able 
to develop into autonomous organizations, to avoid long-term dependence on external aid. 
 
Both countries show similarities in the development of institutional context, with high state involvement 
in the 1960-70s, which was gradually replaced by an increased role for private investments in processing 
in the 1980s, followed by a phase of liberalization with unregulated dairy prices from the 1990s onwards. 
This new institutional context leads to more complex multi-stakeholder dairy chain coordination, and to 
more competitive and efficient service provision by dairy cooperatives.  
 
Government attitudes towards cooperatives and producer organizations is steadily changing in many 
developing and emerging economies (Bijman et al., 2016). In the case of Morocco and Kenya, dairy 
cooperatives are considered by the state as important agents of change. This has resulted in open 
debate and policies on improving the institutional environment to support these organizations. 
 
Quality-based payment schemes are being piloted in Kenya. Given the need for close collaboration in 
the dairy chain and the investment and organizational demands on the collection centres, these pilots 
are currently led and funded by foreign donors and NGOs. Theoretically, final milk processors could 
pay premiums for good-quality milk, and invest this in order to help primary cooperatives improve the 
testing of milk deliveries. Quality-based payment to the supplying cooperative is one important step to 
increase the quality of the raw milk used for processing. In Morocco, the share of milk that is 
channelled through the processing industry is much larger than in Kenya. This creates better starting 
points to establish quality-based payment systems by processors to the primary cooperatives. But to 
become really effective for quality enhancement, the primary cooperatives would need to make 
individual payments for milk deliveries, as group deliveries continue to allow free-riding behaviour by 
group members. Here, again, the issue of the cost of milk quality testing remains an important hurdle. 
 
The government could play an important role in facilitating the necessary investments in reliable 
instruments for decentralized quality testing at the milk collection points. Primary cooperatives are not 
able to solve the problem of low quality individually, because quality testing equipment is expensive. 
Because members have alternative options to sell their milk, it is unlikely that a majority of them 
would agree on investments in such equipment. This problem can only be solved with investment by 
the processors, enforced by state regulations on minimum milk quality and compulsory quality testing. 
Both in Kenya and Morocco, the state can play an important role in milk quality enhancement by 
setting minimum standards, controlling compliance and sanctioning non-complying actors. Improving 
quality control together with raising dairy productivity should be part of the overall incentives to 
benefit breeder associations and dairy research institutes. 
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4.3 Public-private policy dialogues 
Both quality improvement and the introduction of fair and efficient payment schemes may need closer 
collaboration between public and private partners in the dairy industry– not only to improve 
information exchange, but also because some regulation may be needed to help the sector solve 
problems of collective action. Regulations may be issued by the state or by a public-private 
organization having sufficient authority in the industry. By facilitating the creation of a platform for 
professional organizations and agricultural cooperatives to discuss policies, the government can 
support the development of much-needed networking and collaboration. 
 
In Kenya, the cooperative sector is based on a strong network of first- and second-tier cooperatives, 
which have developed links with private processors and policy-makers. A strong coordinating role is 
played by the Kenyan Dairy Board, which represents all major private and public actors of the dairy 
value chains. In Morocco, links between dairy cooperatives, dairy processing companies and the 
government are only just starting to form. A promising development is the recent establishment of the 
interprofessional platform, FIMALAIT, to design appropriate dairy policies, and act as a mobiliser of 
investment support to address the milk quality challenges. In the end, good collaboration among the 
state, farmer organizations, private companies and NGOs, could lead to a more “pro-active role in 
overcoming market constraints to achieve pro-poor agricultural growth” (Ortmann and King, 2007). 
 
 
4.4 Recommendations for an enabling institutional 
environment 
In both countries, the change in the dairy landscape following the liberalization of the dairy markets in 
the 1980s represents a an opportunity to redefine not only the roles of the various actors along the 
chain but also the role of the state in achieving a more equitable distribution of benefits. The state can 
perform a strategic and facilitation role by presenting a strategic vision of dairy development, 
stimulating coordination between public and private actors in the dairy industry, and presenting clear 
regulations on milk quality and fair payment schemes. Table 7 lists the main challenges and initiatives 
that we documented in the case study research. Below, we recommend policies and institutional 
arrangements that could help the cooperatives to develop more effective initiatives. 
Improve awareness of quality at consumer level 
Informing consumers about the nutritional quality of dairy products can be done by public-private 
collaboration in information campaigns and special support programmes such as school nutrition 
campaigns. As processed and packed milk is more expensive than fresh milk, a large majority of poor 
consumers choose unprocessed fresh milk, despite the potential food safety risks and the need to boil 
the milk before consumption. It is therefore the joint responsibility of public authorities and the private 
sector to lower the price of dairy products for consumers and at the same time provide food safety 
assurance. 
Improve quality at farm level 
To improve milk quality at farm level, the farmer needs to obtain skills and resources in the form of 
education, training and technical assistance. There is an important role in this for public extension 
services, and/or the cooperatives themselves, with financial support from the state. In Morocco, this 
arrangement would be in line with the Green Morocco Plan and within the mandate of the 
interprofessional organization, FIMALAIT.  
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Table 7 Comparing the main initiatives that resulted from the case studies 
Challenges Main initiatives in Kenya Main initiatives in Morocco 
 
 
Effective 
and efficient 
quality 
assurance 
systems 
Improve awareness of quality at consumer level: 
• Improve regulation to uphold standards 
• ‘Milk ATMs’ to sell unpackaged processed milk 
 
Improve quality at farm level: 
• Increase frequency of collection (twice a day) 
• Impromptu checks by quality assurance team 
• Social control by observer farmers 
• Train farmers in milk handling and storage 
• Apply preventive antibiotics to the herd in shifts 
• Restrict cooperative membership to ‘serious 
farmers’ 
 
Improve quality and traceability at collection centre: 
• Require use of aluminium containers 
• Apply strong sanctions on adulteration 
• Pay graders to apply control tests 
 
Improve transparency and quality testing at 
processing plant: 
• Pilot quality-based payment systems 
Improve awareness of quality at consumer level: 
• Coordinated media campaigns 
 
Improve quality at farm level: 
• Boost capacity development programmes and 
infrastructure.  
• Fine fraudulent behaviour as part of rules and 
procedures; 
• Increase frequency of milk collection 
• Use aluminium cans to transport milk 
 
Improve quality and traceability at collection centre: 
• Separate peddler-provided milk 
• Improve cleaning of cooling tanks 
• Payment of contaminated milk from the 
cooperative to farmers as an incentive not to 
deliver it to the client processor.  
• Investments in quality control devices 
• Regular testing of raw milk density 
 
Improve transparency in quality testing at processing 
plant: 
• Fair use of quality tests by processing plant 
• Agribusiness providing cooperatives with devices 
for quality testing 
• Public investments in accredited laboratories 
 
 
Attractive 
and cost-
efficient 
payment 
systems 
Shortening the payment period: 
• Emergency payment facilities 
• SACCO / bank transfers 
• Use reserve funds 
• M-Pesa transfers to farmers 
 
Provision of additional services by cooperative: 
• Transport  
• Check-off system for inputs and consumer goods 
(store) 
• Training and advice 
• Health insurance payments 
• Link to bank loans (SACCO) 
• Annual bonus based on quantity of milk delivered 
• Developing product value addition 
 
Increase member commitment 
• Gender-sensitive payment 
• Transparency, and rejuvenating leadership 
• Elections in grassroots assemblies 
• Sell shares to raise funds for investments in 
infrastructure 
Shortening the payment period: 
• Rapid payment system in cash or bank transfer 
• Increase bankability of farmers 
 
Provision of additional services as cooperative: 
• Provide transport to collect the milk on the farm 
• Finance social protection services 
• Develop product value addition 
 
Increase member commitment: 
• Reduce the incidence of private peddlers in milk 
deliveries 
 
Dedicated capacity-building programmes can be funded by the sector itself. For instance, the state 
could introduce a levy on all milk deliveries to the processors (or on all sales of processed milk 
products) to provide funding. The latter would imply that the industry pays for the extension services, 
but that the state acts as an intermediary, with regulations to manage the free-rider problem. 
 
Technical training programmes related to improving quality should be integrated in more general 
livestock enhancement programmes that include fodder usage, veterinary care and herd improvement. 
As these elements are likely to be provided by different companies or NGOs, there is a need for 
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coordination among all these business service providers. A public-private partnership organization 
could take up this coordination task. 
 
While farmers need to be enabled to improve the quality of the milk they deliver, they should also 
receive clear incentives that induce them to deliver better quality milk, e.g. by a quality-based 
payment system. 
Improve quality and traceability at collection centre 
From our investigation, it became clear that developing and implementing quality testing to facilitate 
quality-based payment systems are typically the tasks of public-private partnerships, as state 
regulation and financial support must go hand-in-hand with strict agreements both among 
cooperatives (better horizontal coordination) and between cooperatives and private milk processors 
(better vertical coordination). 
 
One of the most salient issues in the Moroccan dairy industry is the dispersed cooperative landscape, 
with a large number of very small milk collection cooperatives in which not all milk is supplied by 
members. The state should induce farmers to have their small cooperatives merge into larger ones, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of their operations. While the decision to remain independent or to 
merge with another cooperative is a decision to be taken by the cooperatives themselves, the state 
can provide support for mergers in the form of managerial assistance, legal advice, and investment 
subsidies in case a new and larger collection centre has to be built. 
 
Also on the issue of traceability and quality assurance, the state has an important role in coordinating 
the various public and private actors involved, preventing free riding and enacting food quality policies 
that set clear standards, while at the same time controling compliance and applying sanctions in case 
of violation. 
Improve transparency and quality testing at processing plant 
Quality testing always implies information asymmetry between buyer and seller, both within 
cooperatives and between cooperatives and the processing plants. As it is in the interest of almost all 
actors in the dairy industry to have clear quality standards, the state can support the credibility and 
transparency of quality testing, establishing accredited quality testing laboratories and facilitating 
public-private platforms for discussions between cooperatives and processors on quality criteria and 
measurement routines. 
Shortening the payment period 
The state can induce dairy processors to pay dairy cooperatives immediately upon delivery of the milk, 
so the latter can pay their members in a timely way. Furthermore, the state can facilitate credit 
provisioning by banks to shorten the payment period for milk supplied to the cooperatives. In many 
countries, cooperative (agricultural) banks are subsidized by the state, on the pretext that low-cost 
loans are a crucial ingredient for rural development. The state could also reduce the risk that private 
sector banks face when dealing with dairy farmers and cooperatives by offering low-interest funds for 
financial products targeted to dairy development, or guarantee funds for working-capital loans to 
cooperatives.  
Provision of additional services by cooperative 
Setting up value-adding activities may be an attractive way to generate additional income for a 
cooperative and thereby for its members. Ideally, such activities are paid from member investments. 
However, such investments are not possible for most farmers. Financial support from donor 
organizations, NGOs and the state could solve this problem, but only on condition that the cooperative 
has a good long-term business plan showing that the value-adding activities can become economically 
sustainable on their own. 
 
The decision to provide additional services by the cooperatives is always subject to much debate 
among the members, but also among supporting organizations and policy makers. On the one hand, 
the provision of additional services can lead to higher member commitment and loyalty. In addition, it 
can solve some of the information and coordination problems that farmers face when choosing 
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suppliers of feed, veterinary services, technical assistance, transport and credit. On the other hand, 
the more economic activities the cooperative carries out, the more diverse the management skills that 
are needed on the part of the cooperative leaders and the more risk the cooperative faces (as all 
activities require some kind of investment which may not be fully regained). Another challenge is that 
not all members may benefit equally from these additional services, which may lead to difficult 
decision-making processes in the General Assembly and Board of Directors. Our advice would be to 
provide only those services that directly relate to the core activities of the cooperative. In addition, 
cooperatives may enter into strategic alliances with other service suppliers, which would also generate 
the benefit of coordination but does not entail high risks for the cooperative itself. 
Increase member commitment 
A lack of renewal of the board often leads to reduced member commitment. Providing education and 
training on cooperative governance can also enhance participation and thereby commitment. Finally, 
the state may induce cooperatives to increase transparency within the cooperative as well as to 
rejuvenate the leadership. For example, the state may introduce clear rules on the composition of the 
board of directors, particularly the time individual board members can stay in office. 
 
Given that a large share of smallholder farmers are women, but that they often have fewer rights than 
men both within and outside the cooperative, more attention for gender issues is needed from the 
state as well as from public-private partnerships that coordinate dairy development programmes. For 
instance, we documented an interesting experience in Kenya, where one cooperative alternated 
payment for morning and evening milk to the man and the woman in each household.  
 
Whereas membership of cooperatives is a purely private decision on the part of farmers, state 
agencies could help cooperatives to make cooperative membership more socially and economically 
attractive. This can be done by information campaigns but also by choosing cooperatives as main 
suppliers of institutional purchases. 
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